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WHEN UNCLE SAM CALLS DOES MA BELL
HAVE TO ANSWER?: RECOGNIZING A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CORPORATE
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
The accessibility of stored information through state-of-the-art
telecommunications systems has greatly increased corporate fear of
the government's ability to acquire and disseminate confidential information. This ability to obtain sensitive corporate information
has naturally generated concern over protectable corporate privacy
interests. In light of these concerns and because protection of corporate information has traditionally been limited to information
that falls within the narrow confines of "trade secrets,"1 the question whether corporations are entitled to broader privacy protections under the Constitution has taken on new and increased
significance. Notwithstanding legitimate corporate interests, only
one court has ruled that corporations have a constitutional privacy
2
right to nondisclosure of confidential information.
Unless information relates to an area of fundamental importance it is not entirely clear whether a right to nondisclosure of confidential information exists absolutely in the individual. 3 Hence,
this comment will first discuss whether this privacy concept inheres
in the individual. It follows that if there is no such recognizable
personal right, it cannot be attached to corporations. After examining whether there is a right to nondisclosure in the individual, the
focus will then shift to the issue whether the existing individual
right can be extended to artificial persons, such as corporations.
Case law focusing on fourth and fifth amendment corporate privacy
interests will be relied upon in demonstrating that such an exten1. There is no absolute definition of what material constitutes a trade secret. State trade secret laws primarily protect information such as processes,
formulas, and devices, the secrecy of which gives the owner an advantage over
competitors. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). See also
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939) (listing factors to be considered
in determining whether certain information should be protected as a trade
secret).
2. Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc). For purposes
of this comment, the term "informational privacy" is used as a synonym for the
"constitutional right to nondisclosure of confidential information."
3. The aspect of privacy which the Supreme Court has given the most protection to is the right to make autonomous decisions in areas of fundamental
importance such as "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
and child rearing and education." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26 (1977)
(quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)).
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sion is reasonable. Finally, because the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) 4 is a primary source through which corporate information is obtainable, the potential impact that a corporate right to privacy would have on the dissemination of corporate information
5
under the FOIA will be explored.
THE INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO NONDISCLOSURE OF
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

The United States Supreme Court first recognized the individual's privacy interests as a constitutional right in Griswold v. Connecticut.6 One source of the individual's privacy interests was
identified in the penumbras cast by the Bill of Rights.7 In Roe v.
Wade,8 the Court further recognized the right to privacy as a sub4. Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250
(1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)).

5. Under the FOIA, any citizen can request information from the federal
government. If the government possesses the information it must release it unless it falls under one of the Act's nine exemptions. Agencies receive thousands
of FOIA requests per year. See, e.g., Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (at time of plaintiffs' FOIA request to FBI, 5,137 requests were already on file); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Weinberger, 411 F. Supp. 576, 579 (D.D.C. 1976) (FOIA requests to FDA average
1500 to 1800 per month). See also Business Record Exemption of the Freedom of
InformationalAct: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, 73-74 (1977) (statements of
Michael A. James and Donald Kennedy).
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis first advocated
the recognition of a right to privacy. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). After the publication of that article, courts
and legislatures began recognizing those legitimate privacy interests. Dean
Prosser helped create a unified view as to the elements of the tort. Prosser
maintained that the tort was actually made up of four distinct torts: intrusion,
false light in the public eye, public disclosure of private facts, and appropriation
of name or likeness. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
7. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-84. Some members of the Court located different constitutional sources for the right to privacy. Justices Harlan and White
found the right in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, id. at
500-02 (Harlan, J., and White, J., concurring), while Justice Goldberg located
the right in the ninth amendment. Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring). See
Symposium on the Griswold Case and the Right of Privacy, 64 MICH. L. REV.
197 (1965) (discussing several justices' rationales).
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that a woman's right
to decide whether to end her pregnancy in the first trimester without governmental interference was within the constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 163-64.
This decision caused much popular and scholarly controversy. See, e.g., B.
WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHERN 238-39 (1979) ("[t]housands of letters poured into the Court ....
Some letters compared the Justices to the
Butchers of Dauchau, child killers, immoral beasts and Communists"). Compare, Heymar & Berzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REV. 765 (1973) (opinion in Roe is amply justified by precedent);
Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972-Term-Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the
Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973) (problems with decision, but defensible as choice among alternative decisionmaking authority);
with Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.

1985]

Corporate Informational Privacy

stantive due process right because it affected a liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment due process clause.9 In its
recognition of a right to privacy, the Supreme Court has essentially
protected individual privacy interests where autonomous decisions
of fundamental importance are involved, such as "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education." 10 Because these interests are so peculiar to the individual,
it does not necessarily follow that these privacy interests should be
extended to the corporation, an artificial person. Therefore, the
question whether corporations maintain a constitutional right to
privacy must be determined according to some other recognized aspect of privacy, such as the right to nondisclosure of personal
information. 1
The constitutional right to nondisclosure of personal information was first acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Whalen v.
Roe. 12 While the Court observed that the right to nondisclosure of
920, 943 (1973) (problem with Roe is Court "sets itself a question the constitution has not made the Court's business"); O'Mara, Abortion: The Court Decides
a Non-Case, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 337 (the Roe Court yielded to the pressure of a
pro-abortion minority).
9. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 ("[t]his right of privacy, whether it be founded in
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and the restrictions
on state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights of the people, is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy"). See also
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.23 (1977) (the Roe Court expressed the opinion that the "right of privacy" concept is founded in the fourteenth amendment's principal of personal liberty).
10. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600 n.26 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713
(1976)). For cases protecting the right to make autonomous decisions, see Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (decision to end pregnancy); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (decision to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(decision to use contraceptives); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(decision on how to educate one's children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (decision to marry, raise family, and worship God according to one's own
conscience).
11. The Whalen Court stated that the "privacy" cases involved at least two
different kinds of interests. "One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions." 429 U.S. at 599-600.
12. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). In Whalen, the Court upheld a New York statute
which required the state to obtain from physicians the names and addresses of
all patients who were prescribed certain dangerous, but lawful drugs. Id. at 59193. Once the information was obtained it was to be stored on a centralized computer file. Id. at 591. The appellees, users of the drugs, alleged that the statute
violated their privacy rights. Id. at 600. The Court found that the appellees'
privacy interests were not unconstitutionally invaded because the statute required that heavy security precautions be taken to assure minimal risk of disclosure. For example, the statute imposed criminal liability on any government
employee who publicly disclosed a patient's identity. Id. at 595. Because the
statutory provisions themselves did not permit disclosure outside of a few government employees, and because there was no indication that the provisions
would be improperly administered, the minimal invasion of privacy was justi-
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personal information was a protectable interest within the scope of
privacy, it subsequently appeared to withdraw from its recognition
of that right.1 3 Consequently, the apparent ambiguity of the
Whalen opinion has created inconsistent decisions in the lower federal courts.
Whether the Whalen Court recognized a constitutional right to
nondisclosure of confidential information was considered by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in J.P. v.
DeSanti.1 4 The DeSanti court interpreted Whalen as holding only
that the required disclosure in Whalen had not violated any possible right to keeping certain information private.1 5 A majority of
fied by the state's interest in preventing the misuse of certain drugs. Id. at 59698.
13. The Court noted that the government's duty to not disclose private information was only "arguably" constitutional, and that the Court need not and
did not decide any constitutional questions that might be presented by unwarranted disclosure of information in government computer banks. "We simply
hold that this record does not establish an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06.
Justice Brennan wrote separately in an attempt to clarify that the Court
had recognized a right to nondisclosure:
The Court recognizes that an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters is an aspect of the right of privacy ... but holds that in
this case, any such interest has not been seriously enough invaded by the
state to require a showing that its program was indespensible to the state's
effort to control drug abuse .... Broad dissemination by state officials of
such information, however, would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights, and would presumably be justified only by compelling
state interests.
Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Stewart also wrote separately to disagree with Brennan:
Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion states that '[b]road dissemination
by state officials of [the information collected by New York State] ...
would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights .... The
only possible support in his opinion for this statement is its earlier reference to two footnotes in the Court's opinion .... The footnotes, however,
cite to only two court opinions, and those two cases do not support the proposition advanced by Mr. Justice Brennan.
Id. at 608 (Stewart, J., concurring).
14. 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981). In DeSanti, a procedure was upheld
whereby county probation officers compiled a social history of juveniles
brought before the county's juvenile court. Following adjudication of the juvenile's case the county was then free to make the information available to various private and governmental agencies. Id. at 1081-82.
15. Id. at 1089. After finding that Whalen did not recognize a constitutional
right to nondisclosure of confidential information, the DeSanti court followed a
case decided prior to Whalen, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The Paul
Court seemed to limit the scope of privacy to the right to make autonomous
decisions in areas of fundamental importance. In Paul,a police department had
circulated the plaintiff's name and photograph to merchants on a flyer naming
active shoplifters. Id. at 694-95. The Court held that there was no violation of
the plaintiff's constitutional right to privacy, even though the plaintiff had
never been convicted of shoplifting. In arriving at this decision, the Court reviewed cases in which there had been an invasion of the right to privacy and
reasoned that "the activities detailed as being within this definition were ones
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courts, however, have interpreted Whalen as recognizing a right to
nondisclosure of personal information. 16 In Plante v. Gonzales,17
for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Whalen
and found that the Whalen Court did recognize a constitutional
right to informational privacy. s The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in United States v. Westinghouse Electric' 9 also found that Whalen established a constitutional right to
nondisclosure of confidential information. 20
very different from that for which respondent claims constitutional protection matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
and child rearing and education." Id. at 713.
16. See Johnson v. Dept. of Treasury, I.R.S., 700 F.2d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1983)
(Whalen recognized individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matter); Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1981) (Whalen recognized two
strands of privacy, one being the right to confidentiality of personal information); Slevin v. City of New York, 551 F. Supp. 917, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (follows
Plante view that Whalen recognized informational right to privacy); McKenna
v. Peckskill Housing Auth., 497 F. Supp. 1217, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Whalen
identified nondisclosure as major element of constitutionally protected privacy), modified on other grounds, 647 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1981); Roe v. United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n., 483 F. Supp. 539, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Whalen identified at least two strands of constitutional privacy, one being the right to avoid
disclosure of personal matters); Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y., Dist. Branch v.
Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1043 (D. Hawaii 1979) (Whalen identified right to
nondisclosure but not applicable standard of review); Service Mach. & Shipbuilding Corp. v. Edwards, 466 F. Supp. 1200, 1203 (W.D. La. 1979) (Whalen
recognized right to avoid disclosure of personal matters), rev'd on other
grounds, 617 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1980), affd without opinion, 449 U.S. 913 (1980);
Robinson v. McGovern, 27 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1372, 1375 (W.D. Pa.
1979) (Whalen recognized plaintiffs' had valid privacy interests at stake). But
see St. Michael's Convalescent Hosp. v. California, 643 F.2d 1369, 1374-75 (9th
Cir. 1981) (following Paul v. Davis, government release to public of plaintiff's
cost information implicates no constitutional right to privacy); Brown v. Duff
Truck Lines, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (follows DeSanti view
that Whalen did not recognize right to nondisclosure); Crain v. Krehbiel, 443 F.
Supp. 202, 208 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (constitutional right to informational privacy as
distinguished from right of autonomy does not exist).
17. 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
18. Id. at 1132. In Plante, a state constitutional amendment required state
and local officials to publicly disclose their personal finances. Five state senators alleged that the requirement violated their constitutional right to nondisclosure of personal information. The Plante court determined that under
Whalen, the senators' contentions did fall within the constitutional right to
nondisclosure of personal information. Id. The court then applied a balancing
test. While recognizing that "[flinancial privacy is a matter of serious concern,
deserving strong protection," the court found that "[t]he public interests supporting public disclosure for these elected officials are even stronger." Id. at
1136. Therefore, the court ruled that the state's interest in disclosure outweighed the senators' interests in nondisclosure and that there was no violation
of the senators' informational right to privacy. Id.
19. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
20. Id. at 577. In Westinghouse, the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health directed an employer to reveal his employee's medical
records. Id. at 573. The employer refused, urging that such conduct would violate his employee's privacy interests. Id. at 576. While the court found such
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The United States Supreme Court's decision in Nixon v. Administratorof General Services21 lends support to the reasoning of
the federal courts that have interpreted Whalen to recognize an informational right to privacy. In Nixon, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act. Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, President
Nixon was forced to turn over the custody of his official records for
examination. Nixon challenged the Act's constitutionality on the
ground that it violated his right to personal privacy. Although the
Court acknowledged the right to nondisclosure of confidential information, 22 it concluded that Nixon's legitimate privacy interests
in the information were outweighed by a great public interest in the
documents, by his status as a public figure subject to public examination, and by the provisions of the Act itself which prohibited com23
plete disclosure.
The Court's weighing of the public interests against Nixon's
privacy interests in determining whether disclosure was appropriate is significant. If Nixon had no informational right to privacy,
then the balancing process carried on by the Court would have been
unnecessary. The Court used the same balancing approach in
Whalen.24 Accordingly, the Supreme Court's use of a balancing
test makes it evident that the Court has recognized some measure
of an individual's constitutional right to nondisclosure of confiden25
tial information.
information to be "well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection," the material was not highly sensitive in nature. Id. at 577. Moreover,

because there were effective security precautions to prevent unauthorized dis-

closure, the interest in disclosure outweighed the minimal privacy intrusion.

Id. at 580.
21. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
22. In discussing Nixon's claim the Court repeated the nondisclosure language from Whalen: "[o]ne element of privacy has been characterized as 'the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters .... .
Nixon,
433 U.S. at 457 (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599).
23. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 465.
24. As one scholar noted:
If the Court's denial that Paul v. Davis involved any substantively protected interest had been truly authoritative, the Court's careful canvassing
of the procedural safeguards provided by New York to the patients whose
drug prescriptions were retained for five years in computer banks would
have been quite unnecessary in Whalen v. Roe....
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 971 (1978). Paul v. Davis is the decision which seemed to strictly limit the constitutional right to privacy to the
right to make autonomous decisions in areas of fundamental importance. See
supra note 15. See also Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1176 (1981) (Paulmust be
read in light of subsequent Whalen and Nixon decisions where privacy interest
in confidentiality found to extend beyond autonomous decision making).
25. See Slevin v. City of New York, 551 F. Supp. 917, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
("any doubt about the constitutional standing of the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters remaining after Whalen v. Roe ... was removed by
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services").
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CORPORATE PRIVACY

In determining that the right to nondisclosure of confidential
information is vested in the individual, the Supreme Court has not
addressed the question whether this right of privacy is extended to
corporations. Because the concept and scope of privacy seems inextricably intertwined with the needs and expectations of the individual as a natural person, it is not immediately evident how a right to
privacy can be extended to a corporation as an artificial person. For
example, the violation of an individual's privacy interests may cause
feelings of humiliation or outrage, whereas a corporation is practically incapable of manifesting such an injury. Two reasons, however, have been proposed as grounds for granting corporations
privacy protections. First, because the individual is closely involved
with his corporate employer, his privacy interests cannot be fully
protected unless the privacy interests of the corporation are protected. 26 Second, as a practical consequence, disclosure of confiden27
tial corporate information can adversely affect corporate profit.
The only case in which a court extended the right of nondisclosure of confidential information to corporations was a panel decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Tavoulareas v. Washington Post 28 Although Tavoulareas was recently vacated on rehearing, it is important to discuss
the decision for two reasons. First, because it is the only decision
which attempted to extend an informational right of privacy to corporations, an analysis of the case will provide valuable insight into
whether such an extension can be reached constitutionally. Second,
an analysis of the case is necessary in order to determine whether
the decision was vacated on the ground that corporations have no
right to informational privacy.
In Tavoulareas, the president of Mobil Oil filed an action for
26. Corporate and noncorporate associations have been given standing to
assert the constitutional association rights of their members. See California
Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974) (organizations, corporate or
noncorporate, may have standing to assert that constitutional rights of members be protected from governmentally compelled disclosure of membership);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (corporation may assert on own behalf first amendment associational rights of members); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1958) (association may assert members'
right of associational freedoms).
27. Disclosure of confidential financial information can harm a corporation's business interests just as easily as it can harm the interests of an individual. See Wright, The Protection of Corporate Privacy, 11 INT'L Bus. LAw. 119
(1983).
28. Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), vacated
on other grounds, 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
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libel against the Washington Post. 2 9 The Post served broad discovery requests on Mobil and, after completing the trial on the libel
claim, Mobil moved for the return of its confidential documents.
When the Post then moved to unseal all the documents, including
3,800 deposition pages not used at trial, Mobil claimed that this material contained confidential information, the disclosure of which
would cause competitive harm. 30 The Tavoulareas court ordered
the material sealed, holding that the corporation had a constitu31
tional interest in the nondisclosure of the 3,800 deposition pages.
In determining that corporations have a constitutional privacy
interest in the nondisclosure of such information, the Tavoulareas
court relied upon G.M. Leasing v. United States,32 and Civil Aeronautics Board v. United Airlines.33 Those decisions held that corporations possess legitimate fourth amendment expectations of
confidentiality in internal commercial information. Although the
Tavoulareas court found that corporations are protected from unlawful demands made in the name of public investigation, the court
recognized California Bankers v. Schultz 34 as establishing that

"corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoy-

ment of a right to privacy. ' 35 Regulatory agencies have a legitimate
right to insure that corporate behavior is consistent with the law
and public interest.36 Although the Tavoulareas court concluded
29. The libel claim was based on two articles published by the Post which
stated that the son of the president had obtained business benefits from Mobil
through nepotism. Tavoulareas, 724 F.2d at 1012.
30. Id. at 1011-12. Mobil claimed that protection of the material was essential not only to avoid impairing its competitive position, but also to prevent the

possibility of harming its business relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Id. at 1012.
31. Id. at 1029.
32. 429 U.S. 338 (1977). In G.M. Leasing, corporate books were seized without a warrant by the IRS. The United States Supreme Court held that the business premises were protected by the fourth amendment and that the seizure of
the corporate books without a warrant was a violation of the corporation's
fourth amendment rights. Id. at 353.
33. 542 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1976). In United Airlines, the Seventh Circuit
denied the Civil Aeronautics Board's petition for immediate and unconditional
access to United Airlines' buildings and records. The court emphasized that
agency demands for corporate documents must be "reasonably definite and reasonably relevant to some proper legislative purpose" to avoid fourth amendment challenges. Id. at 399.
34. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
35. Tavoulareas, 724 F.2d at 1022 (quoting CaliforniaBankers, 416 U.S. at
65-6).
36. Tavoulareas, 724 F.2d at 1022.
[N]either incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret. While they may and
should have protection from unlawful demands made in the name of public
investigation, corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy. They are endowed with public attributes.
They have a collective impact on society, from which they derive the privi-
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that corporations do have informational privacy protections under
the fourth amendment, those protections were qualified to allow
37
adequate policing of corporate conduct.
The Tavoulareas court's identification of fourth amendment
corporate informational privacy is suspect. On rehearing, 38 the en
banc court did not arrive at a different result on the ground that
corporations do not have an informational right to privacy. Rather,
the court based its decision, in part, on a finding that legitimate
fourth amendment privacy interests did not mandate a protective
order under the particular circumstances of Tavoulareas.39
Although the court did not elaborate on the reasons for its finding,
40
the result reached by the court was sound.
The privacy interest protected by the fourth amendment is a
reasonable expectation of privacy which is not to be violated by unreasonable governmental searches and seizures. 4 1 The right to nondisclosure of confidential information is distinguishable from the
fourth amendment right to privacy because the former encompasses invasions of privacy where no unreasonable search or seizure
has occurred. In Tavoulareas, there was no fourth amendment
question because the information was obtained through legitimate
discovery procedures, not through an unreasonable search and
seizure. The sole question was whether the corporation had a right
to informational privacy which would have been invaded if the information was disclosed to the public. By finding an informational
right to privacy in the fourth amendment, the Tavoulareas court
established a universal right to privacy that contained the right to
nondisclosure of confidential information. Such a broad interpretation of the fourth amendment, however, has already been rejected.
In Katz v. United States,42 the United States Supreme Court observed that "the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a
lege of acting as artificial entities .... [L]aw-enforcing agencies have a

legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent
with the law and the public interest.
Tavoulareas, 724 F.2d at 1022 (quoting CaliforniaBankers, 416 U.S. at 65-6).
37. Tavoulareas, 724 F.2d at 1022. The court reasoned that since discovery
is not conducted to police or regulate a litigant, a corporation's privacy interest
in the discovery context is essentially identical to that of an individual and
should be recognized and protected. Id.
38. 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
39. Id. at 1172.
40. The court based its finding on the United States Supreme Court decision of Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S.Ct. 2199 (1984), which addressed
an issue similar to that addressed in Tavoulareas. The en banc court noted that
the Seattle Times Court had in no way indicated that fourth amendment privacy
interests mandated a protective order under circumstances similar to Tavoulareas. Tavoulareas, 737 F.2d at 1172.
41. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
42. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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general constitutional 'right to privacy.' "43
Although the Tavoulareas court was incorrect in relying on the
fourth amendment to establish a corporate right to informational
privacy, it remains significant that corporations are recognized as
maintaining legitimate fourth amendment expectations of privacy.
The development of a corporate right to fourth amendment privacy
is significant because it provides valuable insight in determining
how a corporate right to informational privacy is constitutionally
feasible. Before discussing corporate fourth amendment privacy
considerations, however, the Supreme Court's treatment of a corporate fifth amendment right against self-incrimination will be examined. By comparing these two developments in the area of
corporate privacy, the methodology by which the Supreme Court
may grant or deny corporate informational privacy rights will
emerge. This methodology can then be used to determine whether
an individual's right to nondisclosure of personal information
should be extended to corporations.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the question
whether corporations have a fifth amendment right against self-incrimination in Hale v. Henkel.44 In Hale, an officer of a corporation
was ordered to testify before a grand jury and to produce corporate
documents. The officer refused to do either and was consequently
held in contempt. On appeal, the officer argued that he should have
been allowed to assert the right against self-incrimination on behalf
45
of the corporation.
In determining whether corporations maintain a fifth amendment privacy right against self-incrimination, the Hale Court recognized that an individual and a corporation are different in that a
corporation is a creature of the state and is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. Because it receives special privileges and holds them subject to the laws of the state, there is a
reserved power of the state to investigate and determine whether a
corporation has exceeded its authority. The Court found that it
would be inconsistent to hold that a state in the exercise of its powers to investigate corporate activity could not demand the production of corporate records. 46 Accordingly, the Court held that
corporations maintain no fifth amendment right against self47
incrimination.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions concerning a corporate
right against self-incrimination have reaffirmed the Hale reason43. Id. at 350.
44. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).

45. Id. at 69.
46. Id. at 75.

47. Id. at 75-6.
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ing.48 This is not to suggest that a state's visitatorial power is the
only reason for denying corporations a right against self-incrimination. More recent Supreme Court decisions have also pointed to the
openness of corporate records, among other factors, as indicating a
lack of the requisite degree of privacy necessary for the fifth
amendment privilege to attach to corporations. 49 It remains significant, however, that corporations are denied this right largely due to
the state's right to police corporate behavior, and not because corporations have no legitimate privacy interests in their corporate
records or because they do not suffer from the effects of selfincrimination.
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the corporate
right to fifth amendment privacy and the government's right to ensure corporate compliance with the law are mutually exclusive. To
effectively grant one right is to deny the other. As will be illustrated, however, a corporate right to fourth amendment privacy is
not mutually exclusive with the government's visitatorial power. It
is not surprising, therefore, to find that corporations have fared
much better with respect to the development of a fourth amendment right of privacy.
Additionally, the Supreme Court addressed the issue whether
corporations have a fourth amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures in Hale v. Henkel. The Court noted that a
corporation is no less than an association of natural persons under
an assumed name with a distinct legal identity. 5° The Court further
noted that a corporation, "[i]n organizing itself as a collective body
. . . waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such [a]
body."151 In holding that corporations are entitled to fourth amendment protections, the Hale Court found that, otherwise, the government could broadly draft a search warrant or subpoena without
regard to whether the information requested was relevant to the
investigation. If such all-inclusive seizures were constitutionally
permissible, the business of a corporation would come to a complete
52
stop.
In United States v. Morton Salt,53 the Supreme Court more
clearly defined the fourth amendment privacy rights of corporations. In discussing a company's fourth amendment claim, the
48. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974) (granting corporations
or corporate officers fifth amendment privilege would frustrate government's
legitimate regulation of corporations); CaliforniaBankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416
U.S. 21, 55, 71 (1974) (citing Hale to deny privilege to corporations).
49. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91-2 (1974).
50. Hale, 201 U.S. at 76.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 77.
53. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
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Court noted that "corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy. '54 The Court acknowledged the public attributes of corporations and held that, although
corporations have a fourth amendment right to privacy, it was qualified by the government's right to ensure that corporate behavior
55
was consistent with the law and the public interest.
It seems clear then that corporations have not been denied privacy protection on the ground that corporations lack legitimate privacy interests nor on the ground that they do not suffer from
invasions of privacy. Rather, corporations are granted constitutional privacy protections as long as those protections are consistent
with the governmental right to police corporate behavior, and, to a
lesser extent, with the reduced expectation of privacy in a publiclycreated entity. When these traditional qualifications are applied to
a corporate right to nondisclosure of confidential information, they
do not operate to deny privacy protections as they did in the case of
a fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. For example,
the government can collect corporate information and satisfy its
regulatory privilege without disclosing the information to the public. It follows, therefore, that under a Supreme Court corporate privacy analysis, corporations are entitled to a right to informational
privacy which is qualified by a government's regulatory power and
by the public nature of corporations.
THE IMPACT OF A CORPORATE RIGHT TO PRIVACY ON THE

FOIA

The FOIA5 was enacted in response to public concern over secrecy in the government. 57 Under this Act, any citizen can request
information from the federal government. If the government pos54. Id. at 652.
55. Id. The Morton Court's holding, that a corporation's fourth amendment
right to privacy is qualified by a government's right to investigate corporate
behavior, was reaffirmed in California Banker's Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21,
65-66 (1974). Although it is clear that corporate fourth amendment privacy is
qualified, recent decisions have emphasized that corporations have strong and
legitimate expectations of privacy inside their enclosed facilities and in their
internal corporate information. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 749
F.2d 307, 314 (6th Cir. 1984) (corporations have "strong expectations of privacy"
within physical structure of facilities); United States v. New OrleansPub. Serv.,
734 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1984) (unauthorized inspection of corporate documents invades corporations privacy expectations); Tavoulareas v. Washington
Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 737 F.2d
1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (corporations possess legitimate fourth amendment expectations of privacy in internal corporate material).
56. Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250
(1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. section 552 (1976)).
57. "The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to
the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and
to hold the governors accountable to the governed." NLRB v. Robbins Tire and
Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
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sesses the information, it must release it unless it falls under one of
the Act's nine exemptions. 58 The vast amount of corporate information available to the government, along with the FOIA's broad
disclosure policy, has caused corporations to have increased concern
for their privacy interests.5 9 While corporations have not responded to the FOIA by seeking protection under a constitutional
right to nondisclosure, American industries have filed a great
60
number of reverse-FOIA suits.

Prior Treatment of Reverse-FOIA Suits
While the FOIA does provide a cause of action to force disclosure of information, the Act does not expressly provide a cause of
action to prevent disclosure. 61 Consequently, submitters of information have been confused as to the appropriate theory on which to
58. The nine exemptions are listed in section 552(b) of the Act. 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b) (1976). See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 291-92 (1979)

(FOIA is disclosure statute whose exemptions do not rule out disclosure, but
only limit agency's obligation to disclose information); Department of Air Force
v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 260-61 (1976) (FOIA's limited exemptions from disclosure
do not obscure basic policy of Act that disclosure is Act's primary goal).
59. Agencies obtain corporate information through a number of means.
Private firms must often submit corporate information in order to acquire government benefits such as licenses. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.30-36a, 70.21-.22
(1979) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission: reactor licenses and construction permits, and government contracts); 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.3, 60-1.7 (1979) (Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Programs). In addition, some regulatory programs require the submission of data as a prerequisite for undertaking various
business activities. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d)(1) (1976); C.F.R. §§ 803.1-.30
(1979) (FTC; premerger notification program); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77aa (1976)
(SEC; issuance of securities). Some regulatory programs also require periodic
reports on ongoing activities. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976) (SEC; period financial reports). See also Superior Oil Co. v. FERC, 563 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1977)
(FPC; annual reports on natural gas exploration and developmental expenditures).
In addition to receiving voluntary submissions, agencies are often capable
of obtaining information through compulsory processes. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 49
(1976) (FTC); 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976) (SEC). Agency subpoena powers extend
to all data relevant to an investigation. E.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186
(1946). An agency having subpoena powers enjoys a "power of inquisition;" it
can investigate "merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not." United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950). See also SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d
1047 (2d Cir. 1973).
60. A reverse-FOIA suit is an action by an individual or corporation which
has submitted information to a government agency and later seeks to prevent
that agency from disclosing the information. See Campbell, Reverse Freedom of
Information Act Litigation: The Need for CongressionalAction, 67 GEO. L.J.
103 (1978); Clement, The Rights of Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosureof
ConfidentialBusiness Information: The Reverse Freedom of Information Act
Lawsuit, 55 TEx. L. REV. 587, 589-90 (1977).
61. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976). Agencies commonly have ten days to determine whether to disclose the particular records requested. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1976). If an agency refuses to disclose requested information,

The John Marshall Law Review
base their reverse-FOIA

suits. 62

Prior

[Vol. 18:915

to the United

States

Supreme Court's decision in Chrysler v. Brown,63 most reverseFOIA theories relied on 5 U.S.C. section 552(b)(4) which states, in
part, that the FOIA requirements of mandatory disclosure do not
apply to "[t]rade secrets and commercial or financial information
obtained from a person and privileged or confidential. '64 The
Chrysler Court held, however, that this exemption did not prohibit
disclosure of confidential business information, but merely gave
federal agencies the discretion to withhold it.65 The Court, nonetheless, did employ the trade secrets exemption in section 552(b)(4)
of the FOIA, section 1905 of the Trade Secrets Act (TSA),66 and
section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),67 to hold
that judicial review of an agency's decision to disclose business in68
formation is available under the APA.

The Chrysler Court reasoned that disclosures made in violation
of section 1905 can be enjoined under APA section 10(e)(2)(A) as an
agency action not in accordance with the law. 69 Because the language of the FOIA trade secrets exemption and section 1905 of the
TSA are nearly identical, it follows that most, if not all, disclosures
of information which fall within the FOIA exemption can be enjoined under the APA as a violation of section 1905.70 Section 1905
the requester can sue for disclosure and the court must make a de novo determination as to whether the agency's refusal is justified. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
62. See Note, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown: Seeking a Formula For Responsible
Disclosure Under the FOIA, 29 CATH. L. REV. 159, 167 (1979) (three different
theories discussed).
63. 441 U.S. 281 (1979). Chrysler involved a contractor's attempt to block
disclosure of manning tables by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs. The tables gave a detailed analysis of the contractor's workforce and he
feared that disclosure would allow competitors to recognize his costs, sales, and
key minority personnel which competitors could then entice away.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976).
65. Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 290-94.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). An officer or employee of the United States
who discloses a corporation's trade secrets, except as provided by law, shall be
removed from office or employment. Id.
67. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). If a person suffers a legal wrong due to an agency
action, or is adversely affected by an agency action, the person is entitled to
judicial review of the action under section 702. Id.
68. Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 317-18.
69. Id.
70. Chrysler,441 U.S. at 319 n.49. "Although there is a theoretical possibility that material might be outside Exemption 4 yet within the substantive provisions of § 1905. . . that possibility is at most of limited practical significance in
view of the similarity of language between Exemption 4 and the substantive
provisions of § 1905." Id. Most courts have found the fourth exemption and
§ 1905 to be co-extensive. See General Motors Corp. v. Marshall, 654 F.2d 294
(4th Cir. 1981) (any information falling within trade secrets exemption is within
scope of § 1905); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1204
n.38 (4th Cir. 1976) (scope of trade secrets exemption and § 1905 co-extensive),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977); Pharmaceutical Mfr's Ass'n v. Weinberger, 401
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does not prohibit disclosures which are authorized by the law, however, and the Court noted that, in addition to statutes, properly
promulgated agency regulations can have the force and effect of
law. 71 Accordingly, agencies can circumvent violations of section
1905 by creating their own rules which permit disclosures of confidential business information. Information which would otherwise
be protected under the FOIA trade secrets exemption and section
1905, therefore, can be subject to disclosure indirectly.
The Chrysler Court pointed out, however, that for the rules to
have the necessary binding effect to authorize disclosures under
section 1905, they must derive from a congressional grant of
power. 72 Unfortunately, the Court created some uncertainty as to
the required degree of relation between the promulgated rule and
the congressional grant of power for the rule to have binding effect.
The Court seemed to apply two different standards. One standard
required that for a rule to be binding, it need only be consistent
with a statutory scheme. 73 The other standard required a careful
examination of the statute to identify a specific congressional inten74
tion to allow the creation of such a rule.

Because most federal agencies are given great deference to create regulations which carry out their particular regulatory schemes,
and because few statutes address the matter of disclosure, the
choice of which standard to apply becomes significant.7 5 Where the
more restrictive "specific intention" standard is selected, very few
disclosure regulations will be given binding effect because it is rare
that Congress specifically allowed for the creation of such regulations. Alternatively, if the "consistency" standard is applied, most
disclosure regulations will be given binding effect because disclosure of confidential business information is conceivably consistent
76
with a number of regulatory purposes.
F. Supp. 444, 446 (D.D.C. 1975) (scope of § 1905 and trade secrets exemption coextensive for purpose of case).
71. "It has been established in a variety of contexts that properly promulgated, substantive agency regulations have the 'force and effect of law.'"
Chrysler,441 U.S. at 295 (quoting Atchinson, T & S.F.R. Co. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S.
471, 474 (1937)).
72. Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 302.
73. Id. at 306-08.
74. Id. In contradiction to the less rigorous "consistency" standard, the
Court scrutinized the legislative history and purpose of section 301 to determine
that 301 did not confer the power to establish disclosure regulations. Id. at 30911.
75. Enabling statutes often give agencies the power to promulgate regulations "necessary and appropriate" to effectuate the purpose of the statutes. E.g.,
15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1976) (SEC); 42 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1976) (SEC); 42 U.S.C. § 1302
(1976) (Department of HEW); 42 U.S.C. § 2201(p) (1976) (Nuclear Regulatory
Commission); 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1976) (FCC).
76. For example, permitting disclosure of confidential business information
may enhance public understanding of the agency's regulatory mission and its
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Since Chrysler, most courts have applied the "consistency"
standard.7 7 In Humana of Virginia v. Blue Cross of Virginia,78 for
example, a group of hospitals sought to enjoin the Blue Cross of
Virginia from publicly disclosing their cost reports. 79 The hospitals
argued that the information would cause substantial harm to the
hospitals' competitive positions, and therefore it came under the
protection of section 1905. The court permitted disclosure, however, on the ground that it was reasonable to find that the legislature's grant of authority contemplated the agency's disclosure
regulation.80 Accordingly, the application of the "consistency" standard resulted in the ability of an agency to circumvent the prohibition of section 1905 by creating its own regulation which allowed
81
disclosure of confidential business information.
Agency Disclosure Regulations in Light of a CorporateRight to
InformationalPrivacy
In order to determine whether corporate informational privacy
interests are invaded when agencies regulate the disclosure of confidential business information, the applicable constitutional standard
need first be delineated. The answer to the question of which standard should be applied is not readily apparent for two reasons.
First, although Whalen and Nixon both applied a balancing of interests analysis, neither opinion expressly adopted a balancing test
as the appropriate tool for informational privacy analysis. Second,
Whalen and Nixon involved a governmental collection of confidential information, thus the question remains as to whether the
internal processes. Note, Protecting Confidential Business Information From
FederalAgency Disclosure After Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
109, 121 (1980). Further, the disclosure of confidential business information arguably is consistent with a congressional grant of authority to collect the information. See Clement, The Rights ofSubmitters to Prevent Agency Disclosureof
Confidential Business Information: The Reverse Freedom of Information Act
Lawsuit, 55 TEx. L. REv. 587, 623 (1977).
77. See General Motors Corp. v. Marshall, 654 F.2d 294, 296 (4th Cir. 1981)
(exemption in § 1905 for disclosures "authorized by law" may be grounded
either on an express statute or on regulations issued in accordance with a congressional grant of legislative authority); Humana of Virginia v. Blue Cross of
Virginia, 622 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1980) (to give disclosure regulation binding
effect, it is only necessary that it is reasonabe to conclude that grant of authority contemplates regulation issued); St. Mary's Hospital, Inc. v. Harris, 604 F.2d
407, 410 (5th Cir. 1979) (since legislative authority can be reasonably construed
to contemplate disclosure regulation, regulation binding for purposes of § 1905).
78. 622 F.2d 76 (4th Cir. 1980).
79. Id. at 77.
80. Id. at 79.
81. This is not to suggest that agencies may regulate disclosure of confidential business information without reason. Everytime they regulate disclosure,
their ability to obtain complete and accurate information from business is diminished since it becomes a disincentive for business to submit information in
the first place.
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same standard should apply to the public dissemination of such
information.
The leading case that explored the proper standard was Plante
v. Gonzales.8 2 In Plante,the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit noted that more scrutiny was required than a mere
rationality test because, otherwise, public disclosure requirements
could be extended to anyone in virtually any situation.8 3 Likewise,
a strict scrutiny analysis was inappropriate because "the Supreme
Court has warned against giving heightened attention to cases involving new 'fundamental interests.' ",84 The Plante court held that
when government disclosure of private information is challenged, a
balancing test is the appropriate standard of review. The constitutionality of the government act will be determined by comparing
85
the interests it serves with those it hinders.
An analysis of the circumvention of section 1905 and the FOIA
trade secrets exemption has focused on whether Congress granted
the agency the power to regulate disclosure. In light of a corporate
right to informational privacy, the question of disclosure power becomes preliminary and the focus shifts to whether the invasion of
corporate privacy is outweighed by the government interest in disclosure. Because the government already has the information, the
government interest in ensuring that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest is satisfied. Accordingly,
under these circumstances, a corporation's informational right to
86
privacy closely parallels that of the individual.
In Whalen and Nixon, the Supreme Court found that a relatively minimal invasion of privacy was outweighed by the government's interest in obtaining the information. In both cases the
privacy intrusions were considered minimal primarily because any
private information was viewed by only a few government officials
82. 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978).
83. Id. at 1134. The mere rationally standard requires only that the law
uses means which are rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. See, e.g.,
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
84. Plante,575 F.2d at 1134 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973)).
85. Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134. Most courts have followed the Plante court's
lead in applying a balancing of interests analysis to informational privacy questions. See Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1981) (Plante recognized
that balancing test appropriate for informational privacy analysis); Duplantier
v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 670 (5th Cir. 1979) (balancing test rather than
strict scrutiny to be used in cases involving nondisclosure privacy right);
Schacter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1978) (balancing test applied to question of invasion of informational privacy).
86. Of course, even under these circumstances, a corporate right to informational privacy will still be somewhat less than an individual's because corporations have public attributes and are in the public eye.
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and was not subject to public disclosure.8 7 It follows from these
decisions, therefore, that the public disclosure of confidential business information constitutes a significant invasion of corporate privacy, and is subject to a serious constitutional challenge. Due to
this challenge, the possibility of agencies publicly disclosing confidential business information decreases because the interest in disclosure will often not outweigh the significant invasion of corporate
informational privacy. In effect, an agency's prior discretion to regulate disclosure is removed unless there is a substantial government
interest in disseminating the information.
Other Disclosure Problems Under the FOIA
The ability of regulatory agencies to circumvent the FOIA
trade secrets exemption and section 1905 of the TSA is not the only
disclosure problem that corporations face. A concomitant problem
is that courts have given a very narrow interpretation as to the type
of information that is protected under these two sections. The
FOIA exempts "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential"8 8 from
mandatory disclosure. In determining whether information falls
within the FOIA exemption, almost all litigation has focused on the
89
confidential nature of the information.
The accepted test for confidentiality under the FOIA was established in National Parks and Conservation v. Morton.90 Confidentiality of commercial information is established where
disclosure of the information would "impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future" or where disclosure would "cause substantial harm to the competitive position of
the person from whom the information was obtained." 9 1 Resolu87. See also United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 580
(3d Cir. 1980) (because adequate statutory and security precautions to prevent
unauthorized disclosure existed, interest in disclosure outweighed minimal privacy intrusion); Louisiana Chemical Ass'n v. Bingham, 550 F. Supp. 1136 (W.D.
La. 1983) (employees' privacy rights adequately protected under Whalen since
security measures circumscribing use of personal information and no indication
that security measures will not be enforced), affd, 731 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1984).
88. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1982).
89. See Comment, Confidential Treatment and the FOIA, 18 N. ENG. L.
REV. 783, 797 (1983) (almost all exemption 4 litigation centered on definition of
"confidential").
90. 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
91. Id. at 770. Accord Worthington Compressors v. Costle, 662 F.2d 45 (D.C.
Cir.), opinion sub nom., Worthington Compressors v. Gorsuch, 668 F.2d 1371
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Volz v. United States Dept. of Justice, 619 F.2d 49 (10th Cir.
1980); Shermco Indus. v. Secretary of the Air Force, 613 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir.
1980); Gulf & Western Indus. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
American Airlines, Inc. v. National Mediation Bd., 588 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1978);
Continental Stock Transfer & Trust Co. v. SEC, 566 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1977);
Sears Roebuck & Co. v. General Serv. Admin., 553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
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tion of the economic harm issue requires the difficult burden of
proving that substantial competitive injury would likely result
from disclosure. 92 Where a specific request is made for the infor93
mation, a failure to establish either point requires disclosure.
If corporations are entitled to a constitutional right to informational privacy, the foregoing test for confidentiality is too narrow.
The requirement of such a high standard of confidentiality permits
the disclosure of information that may cause competitive harm even
where the government's interest in disclosure is minimal. This
standard has the potential to violate the corporation's informational
privacy interests. Even if the competitive harm caused by disclosure is neither substantial nor likely, it may still be of significant
importance to outweigh a poor reason for disclosure. To avoid this
potential invasion of corporate informational privacy, the confidentiality test should be expanded to include information where there
is a reasonable basis to believe that disclosure of the information
94
would harm the submitter's commercial interests.
It can be argued that this more encompassing definition of confidentiality will result in the nondisclosure of virtually all corporate
material because there is a reasonable basis to believe that the disclosure of most corporate information will cause competitive harm.
This argument fails, however, because if a request for information
is denied, the requester can sue for disclosure and the court must
make a de novo determination whether the agency had a reasonable
basis for concluding that disclosure would cause competitive
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1978); Stone v. Export-Import Bank of United States,
552 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978); National Parks &
Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Charles River Park
"A", Inc. v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Continental Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 519 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1975), cert
denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan
Bank Bd., 426 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Ark. 1977), affd, 570 F.2d 693 (8th Cir. 1978).
92. National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 679
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
93. Id. Under the two prong test, the information will also be classified as
confidential if disclosure is likely to impair the government's ability to obtain
such information in the future. If an agency chooses to not classify information
as confidential, however, it is difficult for a corporation to argue that the agency
is unable to guard its best interests. Stated alternatively, to classify the information as confidential, the corporation has to argue that the agency failed to
realize that disclosure of the information will impair its ability to obtain such
information in the future.
94. The ABA, at its mid-winter 1982 meeting, approved a resolution which
called for a similar definition of confidential information under the FOIA. National Security, Law Enforcement and Business Secrets Under the Freedom of
Information Act, 38 Bus. LAw. 707, 726 (1983). Under this broader definition,
agencies can still often regulate disclosure of information which is only marginally confidential since the interest in disclosure will usually outweigh the minimal invasion of privacy.
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harm.95 If the court finds that the agency made a proper determination, it can still order disclosure if the public interest in disclosure outweighs any invasion of informational privacy. Accordingly,
this revised definition of confidentiality is appropriate because it is
broad enough to protect a corporation's informational privacy interests, and yet it will not prevent disclosure when disclosure should
legitimately be granted. 96
CONCLUSION

The fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures and the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination were recognized from their inception to inhere in
the individual. It was not until these rights matured in the individual that they were applied to corporations. In contrast to the longstanding fourth and fifth amendment areas of privacy, the
individual right to informational privacy is in its infancy.97 This
95. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
96. Another problem under the FOIA is where an agency fails to classify
information as confidential which should be so classified. There are several
reasons why an agency may hesitate to classify information as confidential.
First, sometimes an agency will disclose information despite the fact it should
be classified as confidential, believing that the submitter's confidentiality interests are outweighed by the public interest in disclosure. Second, agencies usually gain little by withholding information as confidential, and therefore often
do not wish to assume the risk of litigation with a disappointed requestor.
Third, it is often not apparent that particular information is confidential because the test of causing competitive harm requires knowledge of the submitter's circumstances which few agencies possess.
See Note, Protecting
Confidential Business Information from Federal Agency Disclosure After
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 109, 112 (1980).
Under the FOIA, there are no procedures which give a submitter notice
and an opportunity to object before business information is disclosed. This allows an agency to classify confidential information as non-confidential, and disclose it before a corporation has a chance to act. Such a possibility is
unacceptable in light of a corporate right to privacy because once the information is disclosed, a corporation's privacy interests are destroyed. Therefore, in
order to give a corporate right to privacy substance and protection under the
FOIA, pre-disclosure procedures will need to be established. Cf. Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (those affected by administrative action must
receive hearing "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner"). These
procedures should take the form of notice and an opportunity to seek judicial
review of the agency's decision to disclose.
97. In the recent decision of Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, the Supreme Court of the United States once again declined to clearly
hold that the constitutional right to nondisclosure of confidential information
exists in the individual:
Certainly, a juror has a valid interest in not being required to disclose to all
the world highly personal or embarrassing information simply because he
is called to do his public duty. We need not decide, however, whether a
juror, called upon to answer questions posed to him in court during voir
dire, has a legitimate expectation, rising to the status of a privacy right, that
he will not have to answer those questions.
104 S. Ct. 819, 826 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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privacy interest also needs to mature and withstand review as an
individual right before it can be applied to corporations. When this
progression occurs, however, an informational right to privacy will
be extended to corporations, subject both to the legitimate demands
of public disclosure and the governmental right to ensure that corporate behavior is consistent with the public interest. Rather than
act to put corporate activity beyond government and public view,
this new corporate right to informational privacy will operate to
give corporations fair and legitimate protections of confidential
98
information.
William C. Lindsay

98. For example, eighty-five percent of the FDA requests for L-iformation
under the FOIA are made by other competitive drug companies and it is this
kind of invasion of corporate privacy which an informational right to privacy
will help eliminate. Comment, Business and the Freedom of Information Act,
38 Bus. LAw. 707, 727 (1983). It is both interesting and paradoxical that perhaps
the last "person" who wants a corporate right to privacy, at least in the FOIA
context, are corporations themselves because the FOIA is the pipeline through
which many corporations draw information on their competitors.

